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| Chairman,
Toyota Motor Corporation. |
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Fujio
Cho, Chairman, of Toyota Motor
Corporation (TMC) was born in 1937, in Tokyo,
Japan. Cho went on to get his law degree
in 1960 from Tokyo University after which
began his 45-year career with Toyota. In
these years he has spanned numerous positions
such as 1960–1966, apprentice and
training employee; 1966–1974, Production
Control Division; 1974–1984, Manager
in Production Control Division. In 1984,
he was appointed General Manager of Logistics
Administration and Project General Manager
of Production Control Division, and in 1985,
additionally became the Project General
Manager of North America Project Preparation
Department. In 1987, he was named TMC Project
General Manager of North America Project
Department. In July of the same year, he
was appointed Executive Vice President of
Toyota Motor Manufacturing (TMM). In September
1988, he became TMC Director, and in December
1988, he was appointed President of TMM,
S.A. Inc. (now Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc.). He returned to Japan in
September 1994 as Managing Director of TMC
in charge of Government and Public Affairs,
IT & Telecom Business. In June 1996,
he was appointed Senior Managing Director
of TMC. In June 1998, he was named Executive
Vice President of TMC in charge of Cooperate
Planning, IT and Telecom Business and Information
Systems, and Industrial Vehicle and Equipment.
In 1999, he became CEO and President. In
his prolific rise, he has been a recipient
of various esteemed awards such as, Manager
of the Year, Automotive Hall of Fame, 2001;
Honorary Doctorate in Engineering, University
of Kentucky, 2002; Top Managers, BusinessWeek,
2003. Cho is Toyota Motor Corporation's
first Director of the 21st century. It was
not long before he became one of the company's
top production experts. He was personally
taught by Taiichi Ohno, author of the system
of lean production. Under Cho's leadership
Toyota became the number-two automotive
company in the world and led the industry
in the use of hybrid technology and advanced
production techniques. He entered Tokyo
University in the mid-1950s, where he studied
law—an unlikely discipline for a future
industrialist. He graduated in 1960 at the
age of 23 and began working for Toyota that
same year. He became a member of the Toyota
corporate family through "adoption,"
not birth, as had been the case for his
predecessor, Shoichiro Toyoda. Cho might
have remained a minor administrative official
in the provincial Japanese company had it
not been for Dr. Taiichi Ohno, who would
dramatically change the destinies of both
Cho and Toyota. Ohno became one of the most
revered men in Japan through his formulation
of the theory and practice of lean production.
In the 1950s and early 1960s Toyota was
struggling to make trucks and cars only
for the Japanese home market. Eiji Toyoda,
the then highest ranking member of the founding
family, dreamed of making Toyota a global
company and of marketing passenger cars
in America. The company, however, was not
ready: Toyota vehicles were shoddy and underpowered.
Ohno devised a plan for cost-effective production,
wherein if the assembly process could be
perfectly timed, there would be no need
to worry about accumulating expensive inventories.
Shoichiro Toyoda, the future heir to the
company and the second cousin of Eiji, adopted
this procedure in the production division
and combined it with a systematic quality-control
program. By the time Cho was rotating through
the company as an apprentice, the outlines
of the Toyota Production System (TPS) were
in place. It worked clumsily at first, but
the number of defects on the assembly line
soon dropped sharply. Toyota cars were first
marketed in America in the mid-1960s. Cho
was posted to the Production Control Division
in 1966, just as the Toyota Corona began
selling in America. There he was thoroughly
trained by Ohno, who became his personal
mentor. Ohno made a deep impression on Cho,
who become a manager while still in his
early 30s. Ohno schooled Cho through lectures,
study groups, and hands-on sessions in the
factories of Toyota City. Most relevantly
he taught Cho the three formulas that were
the essence of the TPS: First, top managers
needed not only to believe in the system
but also to convey their commitment to lower-level
employees. Second, everyone down to the
most menial Toyota worker had to fully participate.
Finally, the system needed to be internalized
by all employees, who were to be dedicated
to its kaizen, or constant improvement and
ever-increasing efficiency. Cho was given
the duty of sharpening the administrative
side of the TPS and this helped Cho learn
to look forward to future trends, not back
to past or present economic situations.
Another important lesson that Ohno impressed
upon Cho was that kaizen applied to companies
and individuals alike; a good professional
was ever in need of improvement. Ohno also
taught Cho that the TPS was more than just
a system: it became, in fact, the guiding
philosophy for the entire Toyota firm. Cho
continued to manage production and apply
his lessons so effectively that he was put
in charge of logistical management by 1984.
More than any other major Toyota official
Cho was shaped by his American experience,
of which he was destined to have plenty.
The then President Shoichiro Toyoda was
so impressed with Cho that he appointed
him as General Manager of Toyota Motor Manufacturing
USA. When the company decided to open its
first North American plant in Georgetown,
Kentucky, Cho was sent to America to manage
it. The plant opened in May 1988; Cho considered
this to be the beginning of Toyota's globalization.
He directed operations at the plant, which
was tremendously successful, until his return
to Japan in 1994. Cho brought to America
the same management style that he had practiced
in Nagoya and Toyota City. He walked the
shop floor and stared for many minutes at
the assembly line, asking questions of and
listening to answers from Kentuckians as
easily as he had with Japanese. Despite
his lack of an engineering degree, Cho gradually
acquired a thorough practical knowledge
of the mechanics of cars and trucks as well
as of the buying habits of Americans. One
lesson became very important to him: Americans,
he discovered, wanted Japanese quality—especially
Toyota quality. Cho would not be disappointed
by his American charges. Soon, American
consumers proved just as loyal to American-made
Toyotas as they had to imported ones, soon
opening the way for additional American
Toyota plants. Both Toyota and Cho were
very much honored and respected for the
prosperity the company's success brought
to Georgetown. The company was regarded
as an outstanding corporate citizen, and
in 2002 Cho was awarded an Honorary Doctorate
in Engineering by the University of Kentucky.
No sooner did Cho return to Japan than he
was introduced to his next mentor, the new
Toyota President Hiroshi Okuda. Cho continued
to serve as Senior Managing Director as
he had for Okuda's predecessors. It was
not long after that Okuda left Cho in charge
of Toyota's all-important North American
operations. The TPS was further refined
while Toyota captured 10 percent of the
world automotive market and closed in on
Ford's number-two global position. The company
ambitiously set the goal of dethroning General
Motors by 2010 and becoming the world's
first truly global automaker. In 1999 Okuda
retired, and Cho became the second consecutive
non-family Toyota President. Cho accelerated
the pace of growth that had been set by
Okuda. In the first three months of 2003
Toyota upstaged Ford in global unit sales
for the first time. Much of the credit was
given to Cho, who now attracted much media
attention. Fortune described Toyota as the
most respected company in the world, and
BusinessWeek wondered in the title of a
November 17, 2003, article, "Can Anything
Stop Toyota?" While the country of
Japan remained in a seemingly endless recession
and Japanese management in general was criticized,
Cho presided over a company awash in cash
reserves and still reaping enormous profits.
Writers no longer talked about the Japanese
Miracle but of the Toyota Miracle, for which
Cho was given credit. When questioned about
Toyota Miracle, instead of spouting out
a long lecture on kaizen or lean production,
Cho reduces the essence of Toyota to the
ability of its workers to stop the assembly
line when the situation demanded, resulting
in a total absence of defective cars: "It
is that our employees should be courageous
enough to bring the production process to
a halt, if necessary" (December 3,
2003). The affable, personable Cho is, however,
no less determined to realize the company
vision of capturing 15 percent of the world
vehicle market by 2010 and dethroning GM.
Cho further explains that the 15 percent
goal was less a fixed target than a vision
to motivate Toyota employees to adhere to
kaizen: "When you achieve an objective,
you strive to reach the next objective"
(December 8, 2003). One of Cho's favorite
slogans was "Beat Toyota." Cho
had a formidable task ahead of him. In order
to achieve his stated goal, he would have
to sell over nine million cars and trucks
against very stiff competition. The potential
markets of India and China would not yet
be large enough to absorb this production;
thus, Toyota's new market would have to
come mainly from America and partly from
Europe. To compete in those markets, Cho
needed to address the issues of styling
and image. Many found Toyotas to be reliable
but a growing number of young, upscale Japanese
were turning to the flashy new models marketed
by Nissan and Honda. Cho, worried about
Toyota's aging consumer base, felt that
the company's cars lacked sex appeal: "Our
salespeople are not 100 percent satisfied
with styling," Cho said in Fortune
(December 8, 2003). Consequently, he hired
the British-born designer Simon Humphries.
Cho recognized that engineers and other
"car people" alone could not make
and sell the vehicles that would push Toyota
to number one in the industry. While the
safety features, transmission, mileage,
and engine were all important, so were the
style and total image of the vehicle. Cho
knew that he needed to sell all of those
aspects in a single vehicle. In addition
he wanted Toyota to occupy the leading edge
in the sustainable car culture that he and
others such as Edouard Michelin and his
former superior Shoichiro Toyoda, who had
become President of Keidanren, had talked
about. Using huge resources in capital,
research, and development, Cho took the
lead in marketing the Toyota Prius, one
of the world's first hybrid cars. Detroit
was several years behind when the Prius
was unveiled; the car soon began selling
better in America than in Japan. Cho, encouraged,
set plans to sell 300,000 hybrids worldwide
by 2005. In October 2003 he began selling
the second-generation Prius in the United
States; by the autumn of 2004 he planned
to unveil the hybrid Lexus RX330. Cho perceived
that North America would remain absolutely
paramount to the success of his company.
In 2002 and 2003 Toyota sold more vehicles
there than in Japan, amounting to almost
80 percent of total worldwide profits. Moreover,
America was his key test market. If a car,
truck, or sport-utility vehicle (SUV) sold
well there, Cho and his colleagues could
confidently sell it in Japan and around
the world as well. The Lexus had first been
introduced in America. In beginning to surpass
U.S. automotive companies on their home
ground, Cho increasingly marketed Toyota
Motor Corporation USA as an American company.
In June 2003 he promoted James Press to
be sales and marketing manager and Gary
Convis to be in charge of manufacturing;
the presence of two American gaijin—a
derogatory Japanese term for foreigners—among
Toyota's top executives was unprecedented.
Cho had no problem with the hiring of these
gaijin, considered it to be a wise business
strategy; he noted in Fortune, "Toyota
has been globalized step by step. We are
trying to introduce American elements into
the company " (December 8, 2003). Cho
began to Americanize the Toyota management
system as well, although Convis and Press
were not the ones in charge of Toyota's
American branch. That role fell to the blunt-spoken
Yoshi Inaba, a marketer, not an engineer;
under Inaba, the American Toyota was slowly
moving away from consensus management and
toward more rapid decision-making. Cho continued
to dedicate himself to the principles of
lean production and kaizen. In order for
the long-term goals that the company had
set to be accomplished, the TPS would have
to become ever more nimble and efficient.
While Cho and his company were well ahead
of most of the competition, they refused
to become complacent. Cho knew that in the
21st century consumer wants would be shifting
more rapidly than ever; Toyota would need
to be able to shift just as rapidly to meet
those wants. Cho gave a high priority to
the application of Information Technology
in upgrading the TPS. New models could be
developed and their production processes
computer generated at the very same time.
By 2004 some Toyota plants were using a
new technique that allowed them to hold
vehicle bodies on assembly lines with one
rather than three supports. The streamlined
Global Body Line production process made
it possible to switch from one model to
another on a single line, permitting Cho
to place more robots at any given line location.
This would give Toyota an enormous advantage
over less flexible competitors who would
constantly have to retool or shift production
to other plants to meet customer demand.
Through his example of implementing selective
Americanization while remaining deeply Japanese,
Cho led the way to a new and revived Japanese
management/production model. In contrast
to the business writers of the 1990s, scores
of whom were pronouncing the death of that
Japanese model, the ongoing success of Cho
inspired the 2004 book by Jeffrey K. Liker
lauding The Toyota Way. Cho has indeed set
an exemplary example of management skills. |
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